Archive for the ‘Public Culture’ Category

#523 – Occupy Downton

Wednesday, February 1st, 2012

relating to class relations.

Recent articles (here and here) about the British ITV series Downton Abbey (now playing in the United States on PBS) have noticed its odd incongruencies (and its tantalizing intersections) with the Occupy movement in the United States and around the world. These articles point out that the middle classes are, at first glance, largely missing from Downton Abbey. The show seems to be a classic story of British upstairs-downstairs, of lords and their servants and the ceilings and floors between them. Why then, Irin Carmon asks on Salon, has the program struck a chord with American “liberals” in the upper middle class at precisely the moment when many are largely supportive of (or participating in) a movement against the contemporary aristocracy of monied elites?

It’s a valid observation to make until one thinks about how the figures of Matthew Crawley and his mother are central to the show. This middle-class lawyer and his social reformist mother place the middle-class front and center. However, the way they do so is telling, particularly for the American viewing audience.

What the articles largely miss is that Crawley is upwardly mobile in the most melodramatic of ways—he wakes up one day and discovers that he is next in line to become an Earl. What this sudden deux ex machina does in the American viewing context is to link his middle-class identity at once downwards and upwards. On the one hand, his story is the dream that links the middle class to those below them: anyone might win the lottery, might suddenly strike it rich, might wake up to find themselves a lord or a lady. On the other hand, the Crawleys are a symbolic link of the middle-class to elite power: they are, after all, distantly related to the Granthams.

This shadow life of class relations, stirred up and in flux, is shot through Downtown Abbey, from the plotline of Lady Sybil and Branson the chauffeur to the figure of Sir Richard Carlisle to the downstairs love story of Anna and Mr. Bates. In fact, it is the main concern of the show. The force driving this melodrama is not a nostalgia for feudalism but precisely that the old order of lords, servants, and vassals is under pressure from the forces of modernity.

The sense of the last days of an epoch and its crumbling system echoes contemporary times, when the hierarchies of rich and poor are increasingly coming under pressure. Downton Abbey displaces and resolves these modern tensions by reasserting the paternalistic commitments between the elite and their underlings. Lord Grantham and even his mother, the prim and proper Dowager Countess Grantham, always eventually adjust to the new realities of class in their historical moment. Sometimes they even lead the way.

The emphasis, even celebration, of paternalistic empathy, I would argue, is exactly what many in the American liberal middle classes feel is missing in the current system of American neoliberal capitalism. Many middle-class Americans do not begrudge the rich their riches, but they do long for a sense of reciprocity. They would live gladly with hierarchy within certain codes of the common good.

Others are beginning to doubt even this ideology. The specter haunting Downton Abbey‘s vision of reciprocity reestablished between the one percent and the ninety-nine is the question of whether the twenty-first century demands a new conceptualization of the very relationship between reciprocity and equality. Which is to say that gnawing at the edge of our mass-produced screens and mass-consumed pleasures that give us the melodrama of Downton Abbey is something more disconcerting: the outright drama of contemporary democratic social relations.

For the most part, the show resolves comically into a world of noble aristocrats and aspiring serfs in harmonious social progress. The program’s order is disturbed only to be reestablished anew. It provides a vision of society in which paternalistic reciprocity works. Perhaps this is, at some deep level, what many Americans long to bring to the United States.

But this comic resolution has a tragic undercurrent, for it marks the abandonment of the radical dream of American democracy, which was supposed to replace the English and European structures of hierarchical society with a world in which all were created equal, in which everyone acquired nobility by deed rather than birth. (Admittedly, this is a somewhat exceptionalist interpretation of the American dream; one thing Downton Abbey might be saying to American viewers is that this dream was always a facade, that they were never so far from the English and Europeans as they believed; but if this dream of democratic equality was but a superficial one, belied by a pile of catastrophes, ruins, and hypocrisies, it nonetheless still holds great allure for many Americans as a dream.)

The great question of the twenty-first century may well be one that Downton Abbey dramatizes by being unable to melodramatize it. How can egalitarian power and its tricky processes of effective representation and collective commitment be authentically enacted when the old system does not function anymore? That question is our property, not Downton‘s, and the answers will have to be found beyond where the estate ends.

Links:

#522 – Roll Over Ranke and Tell Hofstadter the News

Wednesday, January 4th, 2012

more on no more plan b and the future of history.

Tenured Radical (Claire Potter) has a typically incisive blog post about the recent “No More Plan B” brouhaha (upcoming panel this Friday at the AHA in Chicago). Calling Grafton a rock star, hers is a synthesis of his call to restructure the values of advanced historical training and Jesse Lemisch’s retort that what we need are jobs, jobs, jobs in education.

Of course, as TR points out, we need both:

Although I think that Lemisch would agree with me on the point I make above, the implications of his argument are that expanded employment (which would enact other kinds of social justice agendas, not the least of which would be expanded opportunities for education) would be enough. I disagree: it is not enough, and this is why Anthony Grafton is a rock star. Arguing that we stop pushing young scholars into a failed market where the most successful will be constrained in their opportunities and intellectual choices, Grafton wants to change the values that have been ineffective in creating jobs for historians. Public history has the potential to create a more free employment system that would support an expanded intellectual community and allow creativity collaborations to flourish.

Furthermore, in a topic that I will take up in part II of this series, Grafton is arguing that the most path-breaking and influential scholarship in the twenty-first century is likely to be collaborative and accessible to a broad public.  Breaking with the model of the exceptional individual, who works in private and competes successfully among professionally and narrowly similar peers, a paradigm that has governed access to the profession for over a century, is in its own way revolutionary.

There’s a lot to consider in TR’s synthesis, but I want to weigh in again with the point that we need to honor the desire of many hopeful history graduate students to become tenure-track professors. Yes, we can, should, and must imagine new modes of cooperative, public historical scholarship (digital humanities in the house). We just need to do so in ways that do not wind up reinforcing experiences of precarity, exploitation, and contingency among the intellectual laborers in the field of history.

In other words, there are important things to cling to in the older, increasingly impossible model of tenure-track professorships. In fact, the longing to be a tenure-track professor seems to me to be connected to the larger critique of intellectual labor within neoliberal capitalism implicit in Lemisch’s curmudgeonly response to Grafton and Grossman. People want to practice the independent craft of history securely, with a range of autonomy and freedom that empowers democratic historical activity rather than impoverishes it.

Ultimately, the question is not just what kind of history we pursue, but also what kind of public we pursue it in. We need to imagine and work toward a public life that supports the knitting together of university history departments, public institutions, and people’s lives in ways that are robustly intellectual and economically innovative. It needs to be a public that expands individual autonomy and collaborative historical research at the same time.

If we do not think carefully about the profession and public life in tandem and work toward changing both, we risk creating a field and a public that merely incorporate historians into existing, exploitative labor markets instead of transforming labor conditions to unleash improved historical investigation and a better public life.

This project, however, will require more collective modes of historical creativity, not just a rock star in the spotlight.

Links:

#514 – Culture Rover’s Unfamiliar Quotations

Tuesday, November 29th, 2011

art, energy, politics.

Art can create an energy. Actually, the fact that art cannot change things makes it a neutral place for exchanges and discussions, and then enables it to change the world.

- Artist JR, in Raffi Khatchadourian, “In the Picture,” New Yorker, 28 November 2011

Links:

#501 – Goodman Theater

Thursday, October 13th, 2011

a new film about paul goodman.

Very eager to see this new documentary film.

Link:

#500 – Culture Rover’s Unfamiliar Quotations

Wednesday, October 12th, 2011

harris m. berger on the meaning of meaning.

Meaning is the fungible currency in the economy of our lifeworld, constantly crossing borders between one phenomenon and its neighbors, one location and the next in experience. …

Valences and meanings move among phenomena, stance, and mood; this movement exists within a temporal space that evolves forward in an iterative fashion, expands in accretion, and even rewrites its own history in retrospection.

— Harris M. Berger, Stance: Ideas about Emotion, Style, and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture, 39, 52

#471 – Self Awareness

Thursday, July 7th, 2011

when the political is personal.

Mid-twentieth century intellectuals were obsessed with locating the public story of politics in the private experience of self-formation, via the insights of psychoanalysis. Then, somewhere in the 1960s, everything flipped. Intellectuals began rooting private experiences of the self in larger political formations. We went from The Authoritarian Personality to Foucault’s panopticon, from the externalization of private crises to the internalization of public power.


Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault: All the better to see you with….

#466 – Against Collaboration

Saturday, June 18th, 2011

X-post from Issues in Digital History.

imagining cooperative interactivity and the democratic digital humanities.

Digital humanities gets a lot of hype as a field: it could be, many argue, the way to connect the liberal arts to the twenty-first century labor market more effectively. At the center of this rhetoric is the notion that the digital humanities encourages collaboration.

Collaboration is supposed to supplant the old ideal of the isolated scholar in a medieval garret or monastic library. In the digital future, supposedly, the humanities can help to train workers for a world beyond the cubicle. Students in the humanities will ostensibly know how to dial in to the network and give themselves over to its tweeting, networking, coding, project managing, interning, and team building. But what are they giving up in these supposed collaborations?

The lack of focus on the complex interactivity between self and group is what worries me about current versions of digital humanities collaboration. And this is not just a semantic issue. It’s a question of what it means to be democratic, indeed of what it means to be human. Aside from the fact that the word reminds me of Vichy France, collaborators must often give up something of their independence, if not explicitly then implicitly. At worst, the word is invoked to mask unequal relations of power. Collaborators in such scenarios are told they must, at some level, submit their sense of autonomous judgment, integrity, and ethics to a larger force: the long tail, the smart mob, the data mine, the wiki, the algorithm, or the market. To do this, at an even deeper educational level (perhaps at the deepest level), they must compromise the very skills of critical reflection, analysis, and interpretation that the humanities are supposed to enhance.

As humanists in the digital realm, then, we must carefully probe the meaning and practice of collaboration. Our goal as educators should not be to train ultimately-submissive workers, but rather to encourage democratic citizenship. I would argue that democratic citizens can become innovative workers in the capitalist marketplace (or any marketplace, or any non-market institutional setting, for that matter), but not the other way around. This is because citizenship demands entering into cooperative relationships, not collaborative ones. By cooperation, I mean to emphasize mutuality and the difficult but wondrous balancing act between self and group that, one could argue, defines humans at their best.

Those who enter into the bonds of cooperation must possess extraordinary skills of perception, comprehension, analysis, negotiation, assessment, and communication. They must consider the relation of the common (and the commons) to the uncommon and distinctive. They must learn to get along, but also to fight for their rights. And they must, most of all, be able to assess the interactivity that goes into the balance between self and group. Here is where the digital comes in, for what defines this emerging world more than interactivity?

If one of our core tasks as digital humanists is to study and explore what it means to be human within the digital, then we might think more about connectedness in all its vexed but powerful dimensions. To that end, I would suggest that we shift from collaboration to cooperative interactivity as a key goal in the emerging field of the digital humanities.

The digital humanities might position training in twenty-first century “work skills” within the broader pursuit of understanding the interactive nature of democratic life in all its senses, from the political to the cultural to the economic. Which is to say that the interactivity of people, and between people and machines, must be hyperlinked to the question of democracy. If it is, then research and teaching in the digital humanities can accentuate the active, fraught, and essential connectedness that technologies enable between individuals and groups. Instead of a few lines on a resume, training in the digital humanities starts to become nothing less than the effort, at both abstract and applied levels, to understand and sustain an interactivity between the flourishing self and enriched collectivity.

#443 – PDAs

Saturday, March 5th, 2011

sex with strangers @ steppenwolf, 2/17/11.

Sally Murphy and Stephen Louis Grush in Sex with Strangers.

It’s easy to characterize Sex with Strangers, which tells the story of an affair between an older female novelist fearful of sharing her second book with the public and a younger, aspiring writer who has experienced commercial success for a tell-all blog about his sexual exploits, as a “look at those young people and their mass cultural depravity!” kind of play.

At first, Laura Eason’s play indeed seems to be a distopian screed about a contemporary digital culture in which tweets, bleeps, blogs, and posts— the continual communications network of cellular, wireless, networked communication—overwhelms intimacy by exploding it into public view.

But the play is actually something far different. It is not so much about sex and strangers as it is about the intimacy of friendship. And it is perhaps most of all about that space between strangerness and friendship. How do two people cross this divide? What moves them from distanced, distrustful formality to immediacy and intimacy? Is that space a chasm that we leap? A moat we cross on a drawbridge? A ravine we dangle over? An undisclosed location in which we first, under cover of darkness, disclose our selves to each other?

Most of all, are the new communication technologies of the digital altering that space between strangers and friends. When you “friend” people on Facebook, Myspace, Friendster, etc. what does this mean not only about becoming friends, but about what it means to be strangers? Is this a privatization of public space or a publicizing of private identity?

The acting in this duet performance by Sally Murphy and Stephen Louis Grush is a stamina workout as the play explores these questions. Since the two characters are writers, the play also connects to larger questions of art, especially writing, in negotiations of the interpersonal. And since the two characters are published writers, hovering over the private spaces in which the play takes place (a bed and breakfast during a snowstorm, an apartment in Chicago) is the larger realm of commercial exchange and its effects on art-making as well as self-making and friend-making.

The play, which at first seems to contrast an older, print-based generation from a younger, online generation, turns out to be as much more about generational continuity as about rupture. It is much more about the ways in which writing carries with it vexing questions of shared intimacy from analog to digital culture.

In fact, the play might better be called Writing with Friends. The steamy affair between the younger man and older woman turns out to be less about the sex and more about the desires for public identity for which the two characters long. The young man projects the idealism of the non-commercial artist onto the older woman, whose unpublished second novel he imagines as a pure work of art against his own sordid success. As he slowly pulls her into his world of agents and publishers (even as he tries to keep her at a distance from it), his is an effort to remake himself through his intimate relationship with her. He will become, by association, through intimacies of love and friendship, a serious writer rather than a playboy blogger. The “boy gone wild” will become a man gone artist.

The older woman, meanwhile, slowly discovers that she desires the commercial success and stability that has eluded her. Half-consciously, Eason suggests, she is using the young man to gain access to the new culture of the digital and secure her own fame. Though she resists the publicized culture of sharing sexual exploits by which the man has made his fame, she agrees to post her new novel as a blog, meet with his agent, and change her novel to secure more fame.

This makes her, perhaps, not so different from the young women who sleep with the young man so that they can post their own tell-alls on their own blogs, thus securing their own public identities through private exploits. Or so Eason’s play implies, not condemning any of these women for their decisions, but rather revealing the ways in which the contemporary mingling of private sexual intimacies and professional or public desires is neither new, nor easily avoided by even those who think, on the surface, that they want to avoid it.

The twisted wireless signals of intimacy and publicity, private bodies entwined and public identities out on the network, makes this not so much a play about strangers having sex so much as about the strangeness of intimacy. And the play’s final scenes suggest that as the boundaries between intimacy and publicness change, as the household and the agora grow more seamless, we might, we must, write ourselves into being while poised at the threshold between feeling amorous and feeling agape.

LINKS:

#433 – Quantifying Public Intellect, Qualifying Public Intellect

Friday, February 18th, 2011

numb and numbered or text and textured?

Being a public intellectual is a way of cementing that public’s investment in the intellectual life. – Cathy Davidson

In her blog today, Cathy Davidson celebrates the size of the Scholars forums on HASTAC (pronounced haystack, and standing for the Humanities, Arts, Sciences, Technology Advanced Collaboratory) as an example of public intellectualism. She compares the number of readers for a typical academic book (400 she claims) to the 350,000 unique hits that the HASTAC forums has received over the last three years.

There is much to celebrate about the HASTAC Scholars forums, which have become a rich and vibrant online exchange network for ideas, responses, arguments, and debates of all sorts. But the framing of public intellectualism around size of audience made me wonder: what do we mean by the term public intellectual in the digital age? How should we qualify it as well as quantify it as we assess what we might do—or think, since thinking is a kind of doing—with all this technologically-enabled knowledge creation?

I want to be clear that I am asking these questions as a supporter of HASTAC, not as a neo-luddite or anti-digital humanities person. I am asking these questions because I am concerned about the scales and “metrics” we can easily and uncritically adopt to judge public intellectual life. Which is to ask: when it comes to knowledge and learning, what is the relationship, exactly, between quantity of participation and quality?

I do not have an answer to this question, though I do think there is ample evidence—indeed, overwhelming evidence—of the quality of intellectual interaction on the HASTAC forums. What I mean is how does the quality, not the quantity, of the public intellectual engagement on HASTAC connect to—or remain disconnected from—the public? How do we give context and texture to numerical measurements of intellectual life?

And what does Cathy mean exactly by arguing that “being a public intellectual is a way of cementing that public’s investment in the intellectual life”? Is she suggesting that the conversations on HASTAC confirm an initial public expenditure on intellectual endeavors, or is she proposing that HASTAC forums are themselves generative, inspiring public interest in the life of the mind? Or both? (I think “cementing” and “investment” are the words I am having trouble fully understanding here.)

As they always tend to in provocative and productive ways, Cathy Davidson’s blog posts addressed pressing contemporary issues. But in this case, her blog also sent me back in time, thinking about how the connection between intellectual endeavors and the shaping of public life has a long and vexed history.

One thinks of Walter Lippmann’s “phantom public,” in which experts were needed in modern, industrial society to step in and guide the common citizen  overwhelmed by access to information (and that was in the 1920s, what would Lippmann have made of the Internet!?). One thinks of John Dewey’s insistence, partially in response to Lippmann, that a kind of social democratic harmonization of the individual citizen and the mass public was possible, and that science, arts, and education (the intellect, for Dewey) were precisely the means to sing the euphonious song.

I also think of Jurgen Habermas’s work on legitimation between facts and norms, his theory of social organization potentially moving from loosely-affiliated public interactions in the vernacular lifeworld up through to governmental instrumentalizations of power in the system (one also thinks of the dangers Habermas foresaw in the growing colonization of the lifeworld by the system).

And I think of the Marxist Gramscian tradition, which pictures intellectuals as class warriors in civil society—which is to say ideological and affective fighters among both the institutions and the open spaces of public life in a democracy. Here, civil society becomes a terrain of struggle, a battle zone of positions in what Gramsci calls a war of position. In this understanding of the public, there is an ongoing competition between different social classes as they compete for hegemonic control over determining what seems like common sense to people. This is, of course, a much more conflictual model than the prior ones.

Most of all, I think of Michael Walzer’s notion of the “connected critic.” I think this might be the best model for scholarly engagement on the HASTAC Scholars forums. Of course Walzer was not thinking of being connected in the digital sense, but for lack of a better word the connection is there.

So one question, if HASTAC Scholars are indeed to think of themselves as public intellectuals, might be: how do they further articulate, elucidate, and critically engage the quality of exchange on HASTAC itself, as well as the quantity? Moreover, how can those who are participating, who have been bitten by the knowledge bug, who seek to join a lineage of specialized academic study (a monastic tradition, after all, that sought to get away from society, though always found itself wrapped up in issues of power, patronage, and hierarchy), how can they democratize their learning, share their findings, while also remaining necessarily wary, alienated, critical, and maybe even unquantifiable in their value to society? What kind of learning community would this be substantively? How do you transform 350,000 unique hits into a space of shared uniqueness?

Perhaps HASTAC Scholars might imagine themselves as gadflys among the gadgets rather than cement pourers filling in frames at the public’s feet. They are not seeking to secure an “investment” in the stock of intellectual life, but rather they might serve as in a role at once more tricky, yet also immeasurably important. They might seek to map out what it means to become not only public intellectuals, but also democratic intellectuals: active participants at the open borders of a republic of letters as well as numbers; thinkers on the edges conversing about ideas as well as crunching data; connected critics balancing individual voices and idiosyncratic views on the scales of collective digital interaction and communication.

Links:

#417 – A Public Reading

Thursday, October 28th, 2010

for jonathan franzen, according to charles baxter, freedom’s just another word for everything lost.

Freedom by Jonathan Franzen.

What has happened, I think, is that the public sphere is regarded here as a total loss, so that all the big problems are imagined as unsolvable, The result is a particular kind of despair, the sort that arises from rage with no outlet, the core emotion of a large proportion of educated readers during the George W. Bush administration. Corrupted by ruinous quantities of money and the cynical application of power, the public world depicted here seems incapable of saving anything of value. At every point when a citizen tries to enter that world, he encounters active lying and the operations of expedient logic, and, in the novel’s view, he becomes a collaborator. Franzen is not a conservative, but he is a conservationist, and his novel watches, helplessly, ragingly, as cherished habitats, cherished beings, begin to disappear.

Charles Baxter, “His Glory and His Curse,” review of Freedom by Jonathan Franzen, New York Review of Books