measuring the odds.
I remain unconvinced that more always means more true.
numb and numbered or text and textured?
Being a public intellectual is a way of cementing that public’s investment in the intellectual life. – Cathy Davidson
In her blog today, Cathy Davidson celebrates the size of the Scholars forums on HASTAC (pronounced haystack, and standing for the Humanities, Arts, Sciences, Technology Advanced Collaboratory) as an example of public intellectualism. She compares the number of readers for a typical academic book (400 she claims) to the 350,000 unique hits that the HASTAC forums has received over the last three years.
There is much to celebrate about the HASTAC Scholars forums, which have become a rich and vibrant online exchange network for ideas, responses, arguments, and debates of all sorts. But the framing of public intellectualism around size of audience made me wonder: what do we mean by the term public intellectual in the digital age? How should we qualify it as well as quantify it as we assess what we might do—or think, since thinking is a kind of doing—with all this technologically-enabled knowledge creation?
I want to be clear that I am asking these questions as a supporter of HASTAC, not as a neo-luddite or anti-digital humanities person. I am asking these questions because I am concerned about the scales and “metrics” we can easily and uncritically adopt to judge public intellectual life. Which is to ask: when it comes to knowledge and learning, what is the relationship, exactly, between quantity of participation and quality?
I do not have an answer to this question, though I do think there is ample evidence—indeed, overwhelming evidence—of the quality of intellectual interaction on the HASTAC forums. What I mean is how does the quality, not the quantity, of the public intellectual engagement on HASTAC connect to—or remain disconnected from—the public? How do we give context and texture to numerical measurements of intellectual life?
And what does Cathy mean exactly by arguing that “being a public intellectual is a way of cementing that public’s investment in the intellectual life”? Is she suggesting that the conversations on HASTAC confirm an initial public expenditure on intellectual endeavors, or is she proposing that HASTAC forums are themselves generative, inspiring public interest in the life of the mind? Or both? (I think “cementing” and “investment” are the words I am having trouble fully understanding here.)
As they always tend to in provocative and productive ways, Cathy Davidson’s blog posts addressed pressing contemporary issues. But in this case, her blog also sent me back in time, thinking about how the connection between intellectual endeavors and the shaping of public life has a long and vexed history.
One thinks of Walter Lippmann’s “phantom public,” in which experts were needed in modern, industrial society to step in and guide the common citizen overwhelmed by access to information (and that was in the 1920s, what would Lippmann have made of the Internet!?). One thinks of John Dewey’s insistence, partially in response to Lippmann, that a kind of social democratic harmonization of the individual citizen and the mass public was possible, and that science, arts, and education (the intellect, for Dewey) were precisely the means to sing the euphonious song.
I also think of Jurgen Habermas’s work on legitimation between facts and norms, his theory of social organization potentially moving from loosely-affiliated public interactions in the vernacular lifeworld up through to governmental instrumentalizations of power in the system (one also thinks of the dangers Habermas foresaw in the growing colonization of the lifeworld by the system).
And I think of the Marxist Gramscian tradition, which pictures intellectuals as class warriors in civil society—which is to say ideological and affective fighters among both the institutions and the open spaces of public life in a democracy. Here, civil society becomes a terrain of struggle, a battle zone of positions in what Gramsci calls a war of position. In this understanding of the public, there is an ongoing competition between different social classes as they compete for hegemonic control over determining what seems like common sense to people. This is, of course, a much more conflictual model than the prior ones.
Most of all, I think of Michael Walzer’s notion of the “connected critic.” I think this might be the best model for scholarly engagement on the HASTAC Scholars forums. Of course Walzer was not thinking of being connected in the digital sense, but for lack of a better word the connection is there.
So one question, if HASTAC Scholars are indeed to think of themselves as public intellectuals, might be: how do they further articulate, elucidate, and critically engage the quality of exchange on HASTAC itself, as well as the quantity? Moreover, how can those who are participating, who have been bitten by the knowledge bug, who seek to join a lineage of specialized academic study (a monastic tradition, after all, that sought to get away from society, though always found itself wrapped up in issues of power, patronage, and hierarchy), how can they democratize their learning, share their findings, while also remaining necessarily wary, alienated, critical, and maybe even unquantifiable in their value to society? What kind of learning community would this be substantively? How do you transform 350,000 unique hits into a space of shared uniqueness?
Perhaps HASTAC Scholars might imagine themselves as gadflys among the gadgets rather than cement pourers filling in frames at the public’s feet. They are not seeking to secure an “investment” in the stock of intellectual life, but rather they might serve as in a role at once more tricky, yet also immeasurably important. They might seek to map out what it means to become not only public intellectuals, but also democratic intellectuals: active participants at the open borders of a republic of letters as well as numbers; thinkers on the edges conversing about ideas as well as crunching data; connected critics balancing individual voices and idiosyncratic views on the scales of collective digital interaction and communication.
Links:
the curious binaries of the digital humanities.
There seem to be two approaches emerging in the developing field of the digital humanities. They are not mutually exclusive, but there are important tensions between them.
The first, as Patricia Cohen wrote about recently in the New York Times (“Digital Keys for Unlocking the Humanities Riches,” 16 November 2010), is to utilize digital tools of data-aggregation and data-mining for humanities research. The idea here is to consider how the ability to process large quantities of information using computers might yield new insights into patterns of language, literature, history, society, and other topics of traditional humanities scholarship.
The second approach is almost the opposite: to bring the ethics and practices of humanities scholarship—critical reflection, engaged imagination, an interest in narrative, non-reductive argument, civil dialogue, humaneness, and humanness itself—into the digital realm.
The first mode reveals a desire to get with the program, as it were, to transform the humanities into another quasi-positivist social science that privileges, even fetishizes, a certain kind of epistemological legitimacy. More data equals more truth, the reasoning (or lack thereof) goes here. Statistical analysis trumps the uneven terrain of human thought and human experience.
The second mode, to humanize the digital, offers intriguing, if potentially Frankensteinish, possibilities that might counterbalance the worst tendencies of data-obsession. Here, the goal is to bring humanistic awareness to the increasingly virtual spaces of interaction that are made possible by digital communications and information technologies. How do we not treat the digital as a break away from the humanities, but rather as an extension of humanistic inquiry?
There have been a bevy of books that are suspicious of adopting this latter position, naming it as a kind of acquiescence. But these polemics may ultimately, whatever their worth as critiques of the romanticization of the digital, be swept into the paper shredder of history, so there is important—if perhaps complicit—work to be done in investigating the continuities between analog and digital realms.
At this early juncture, I would argue that there is nothing truly wrong with either approach, though I am by inclination more suspicious of the first than the second). What might be most crucial is that the two modes remain in dialectical tension. To uncover all the times Enlightenment thinkers invoked the term rationality in their voluminous correspondence is a worthy inquiry, but only if it leads back to ongoing interpretative debates and conversations—and, more crucially, only if it takes stock of previous methodological approaches that did not view quantity as truth. As Anthony Grafton points out in the New York Times article, “I don’t believe quantification can do everything. So much of humanistic scholarship is about interpretation.”
The digital realm offers enormous opportunities for interpretative work, both about particular topics and in terms of reimagining how collective projects of interpretation take shape, change, and change again. But only if, in the virtual world, we literally keep thinking.
A final thought: why, at a time when the humanities is in crisis and universities are shamefully closing down humanities departments, is the digital humanities attracting so much money and so many funding opportunities? What is this about, exactly? How is intellectual life being channeled into digital streams, and whom is this serving? Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Are humanities scholars scribes of the digital future or are they getting circumscribed by it? What are the forces and powers behind this flow of money to zeroes and ones?
These are questions you cannot Google.
LINKS:
the ins and outs of academic intellectual history.
Christopher Lasch.
No ideas but in things. — William Carlos Williams
At the closing panel of the third annual U.S. Intellectual History conference, whose theme was “Intellectuals and Their Publics,” the ghost of Christopher Lasch very much haunted the halls. A number of former graduate students, and even Lasch’s own daughter, delivered eloquent, forceful talks in response to the question “Intellectual History for What?” They urged colleagues and students to work not only as specialized scholars, but also as cultural and social critics.
But a question from a younger colleague in the audience revealed an underlying tension at the conference. The question was along the lines of (I paraphrase): is the historical moment for intellectual historians to serve as cultural critics and public intellectuals a la Lasch over? Or, is the “intellectual as a social type” no more?
There was a sense in which the question was almost a rhetorical one, an answer to it less crucial than its underlying point. Which was that while established scholars might hunger to reach beyond academe, speaking from the podium to urge themselves and their fellow specialists to address broader public audiences, or to dive promiscuously, as George Cotkin put it, into what David Steigerwald called “the play of ideas across time,” many younger scholars were perhaps there for more narrow reasons of professional accreditation in an academic job market that is so oversupplied that it is almost nonexistent, particularly in intellectual history. Those with security within academia longed to escape it for something less institutionalized, while those outside the gates (or within them, but marginalized) longed for institutional (and economic!) validation.
Of course, the lines between these two longings—to reach broader publics, on the one hand, and to secure positions in the historical profession, on the other—were blurry. Both established and younger scholars at the conference danced between the two. James Kloppenberg’s keynote speech, for instance, focused on the intellectual biography of Barack Obama to explain the deeper history behind the strange paradox of how the President is reviled on the right while, at the same time, met with such intense disappointment on the left.
Like many of the presentations at the conference, Kloppenberg’s talk drew upon his intellectual history “chops” to speak to contemporary political matters. For Kloppenberg, Obama’s own intellectual history provided insight into this enigmatic man. The President’s commitments to a pragmatist’s liberal vision of the United States’s democratic traditions—which turn up in Obama’s books and own education—temper his rhetoric and keep him focused on long-term social improvement while also allowing him to resist the polarizations of degraded contemporary political theater.
But despite the evidence in this marvelous keynote of the possibility that historians might move between specialized academic labor and a broader public culture, the tensions between getting out there into the world and getting in there into the academy lingered. Perhaps when it comes to the study of ideas, it’s still about the economy, stupid? Maybe. There was a sense that the tensions raised by the sharp question in the closing minutes of the conference were less about intellectual issues than institutional and economic ones. If, as the question suggested, the cultural critic of the twentieth-century is no more, if the intellectual as social type is dead, then what next for intellectual history as a public as well as a narrowly-professional concern?
George Cotkin proposed that he felt liberated to write adventurous intellectual history because of his position at a non-research university, but even those kind of academic jobs are few and far between these days, and the oversupply of able candidates for them is startling. So it is true, as Wilfred McClay pointed out, that the study of ideas remains vital both inside and outside academia even if the role of intellectual historians continues to be imperiled. But as Casey Blake essentially declared in his closing remarks, the research university may be dead for pursuing a true and only intellectual history. If civic education, teaching, and writing are still to be part of intellectual life, and intellectual historians are to participate fully in them, what institutional forms, then, should intellectual history work take? How should ideas play across time if there is no safety net below them?
Of course, there never has been a safety net, really. Both within the professional field of history and in the broad public beyond it, ideas still grow, blossom, go to seed, and bear fruit again with abundance. Blake mentioned the website The New Inquiry as an example of a new and hopeful concentration of intellectual energy, and rightly so. But is The New Inquiry an institution in the economic sense? Can it provide the sustenance necessary to sustain the intellect? What will provide the livelihood for lively intellectual engagement?
These institutional and economic questions for the life of the mind have always been fretful ones. There was no golden age for intellectuals in America, even when we look back nostalgically on the burgeoning fields of the Cold War research university or peer through the mists into the unkempt gardens of Greenwich Village or Harlem Renaissance bohemians. Nor, for that matter is today as bleak as it sometimes seems. And even though the current pressures are for the work of public intellectuals to be “relevant” and “do something,” one can be heartened by David Steigerwald’s assertion at the final session that the main reason to pursue intellectual history is not that studying ideas somehow exerts “resistance” or “oppositionality,” but rather that it is, simply put, dignified.
Dignity is something to ponder, and perhaps even something into which we can dig our roots. Dignity constitutes a kind of public act. And it can be a fertile emotion. But this dignity needs support. One task that the U.S. Intellectual History conference, once a blog, now growing into an organization, might address is the intellectual groundwork needed to foster a more expansive institutional space for the life of the mind.
Publics are atmospheric and amorphous. Intellectuals have and will continue to be resourceful in their cultivation. And those ideas, wherever they sprout, will remain hearty. The issue isn’t extinction, it’s robustness. The more we can eat, sleep, and breathe, the more we can eat, sleep, and breathe intellectual history.
So the question posed at the end of the conference really leads to two questions. First, in a world in which history still matters (see the recent uses of the past by Glenn Beck and others), what kind of new structures can make for a less shrill and more intellectual study of ideas? Second, if not the research university as it has existed for academic intellectual history, then what? Websites and social networks? Markets or state-run institutions or non-profit think-tanks or what?
Put another way, the question might be: how do we better institute intellectual history without institutionalizing it?
LINKS:
the vital relevance of making the humanities irrelevant.
Which again raises the question of why anyone would study the humanities today. Then it occurred to me that this was not quite the right question, that we need to move away from asking how to make the humanities “relevant” to the inhumane world we find ourselves inhabiting, and instead try to imagine what kind of world, outside the Academy, would be hospitable to people who wish to make reflective inquiry a vital part of their lives.
- Rochelle Gurstein, “Oh, the Humanities! What liberal arts are good for,” New Republic 26 March 2010
johnny’s in the classroom, delivering a power point…
From IASPM-US Conference 2010, New Orleans.
grafton on distinguishing the humanities from the marketplace.
Anthony Grafton weighs in on Louis Menand’s The Marketplace of Ideas:
But thinking about the academy only, or mainly, as a market is another matter. As Menand unwittingly shows, it narrows the field of vision. The humanities need reform because their traditions are confining and their job market is a catastrophe, but reform cannot mean surrender, or dilution. It means finding out how to do what the scientists have already done: how to combine the rigor of tradition with experiment and innovation–but without replacing hordes of underpaid adjuncts with hordes of underpaid post-docs, as the scientists have. More generally, it means finding creative ways to make life instructively hard, for a few years, for the broadest range of talented people of all sorts and conditions whom we can educate and then employ productively and decently. What makes reform urgent is the passion, the erudition, and the intelligence of those whom the academy is now failing–the sheer destruction of talent and love and energy, of the traditions of deep learning, over which we humanists are presiding. The masters of the next generation are still knocking on our doors, but most of them find themselves too busy speeding down the freeway to their next campus, grading stacks of papers, and worrying about their debts to learn as they wish to learn and as we need them to learn. They are missing from Menand’s cool, lucid, and limited book, as they are from so much of what is thought and written about us humanists in these bad days.
imagining a clean bill of health for the ph.d. job market.
The yearly conferences in the humanities–MLA, AHA, and others–have brought an onslaught of handwringing over the purpose of graduate education in a collapsing academic job market (not that it was ever that good, even during the bubble years).
William Pannapacker, a.k.a. Thomas H. Benton, Dean Dad, Tenured Radical, and others have weighed in on what graduate students, potential graduate students, and graduate programs should do. Basic message: don’t go! Do something else!
Tenured Radical has some particulary intriguing recommendations for humanities graduate programs, her overall point being:
While I don’t think Ph.D, programs are responsible for unemployed graduates, they could do a better job of imagining what an intellectual life in the twenty-first century looks like and how the university can connect to the public sphere is more vital ways.
Lots of valid points made in these critiques, reflections, and comments, but there is one thing that always bothers me about them. We seem to pretend that the job market for intellectual work in the “public sphere” is robust compared to academia. Curating? Working in a library? Not so easy to get jobs in those fields, even if you train directly for them. Journalism? Not doing so well lately. “Content providers” on the Internet? Business isn’t exactly booming like it was in ye old digital revolution days.
Perhaps the larger problem is not that the academic job market is collapsing, but that the “public sphere” of “intellectual life in the twenty-first century” itself needs reimagining.
I don’t mean that everyone should start twittering and blogging and chattering away right now. What I mean is that the problem of the academy is also an opportunity to imagine a “public sphere” and an “intellectual life” whose institutions, economies, and values are not dominated by neo-liberal ideologies of efficiency, productivity, and profit, but also thought, interaction, care, deliberation, reading, and time-consuming investigations. Less banking, more seminars!
Maybe the answer, weirdly, is not that graduate admissions should be limited, but actually that more people should be going to graduate school rather than fewer.
They should be spending more time studying, and part of this study should be about developing a robust graduate education that connects the time-honored traditions of scholasticism–specialization, mentoring, arguing, getting a bit lost in a corner of a discipline–to the reimagining of the public sphere as a place in which the peculiarities of the academia and the general good intersect.
This would mean a dramatic turn in the kind of institutional work of academics, universities, and others. It would mean building a counter-movement to the corporatization of everything that for so many people now feels like the only path. It would mean a lot of struggle. But maybe if things keep getting worse, this struggle will make more and more sense.
Instead of all the banter about how liberal-arts training is the key to finding employment, let’s start talking about how we could imagine the kind of employment that would suit people with a liberal-arts orientation.*
For intriguing takes on the Ph.D. job situation, see:
*Admittedly, this kind of talk occurs more at the undergraduate level, but it’s part of the same mindset that dismisses Ph.D. training as pointless and irrelevant.
caroline walker bynum proposes a work slowdown of historic proportions.
Caroline Walker Bynum has an intriguing essay in the Winter 2009 edition of Daedalus in which she asks historians to slow down. I imagine this applies to most fields in the academic humanities and perhaps beyond to intellectual life in general. Bynum argues that for young historians, value has been placed increasingly on research productivity rather than quality.
To combat this, Bynum argues for a postmodern notion of what historical knowledge is. She wants us to recognize that our own interpretations and arguments are but partial parts of the whole cloth of historical narrative. This ideological position, she contends, could serve as a framework for stopping the knowledge production speed-up that has been afflicting the humanities, and history in particular. Here’s how she puts it:
I propose that we adopt toward professional practices the same postmodern stance that has facilitated creative new work in the substance of our scholarship. For if we could really understand what we undertake as historians to be by definition partial and discontinuous, forever redone and in need of redoing because of our own cultural situated-ness, we—all of us, young scholars and old—would be able to slow down. If there is no goal at the end of the race—that is, if the point is the running not the goal—why sprint instead of stroll (especially if sprinting damages our knees forever)?
Bynum makes an important addition to this argument. For she is no relativist:
Awareness that we all write from a particular perspective and with the aid of specific methods and interpretations does not mean that there is no difference between good and bad arguments; opposing the transparency of evidence—whether objects or texts—does not mean opposing evidence. Indeed, exactly the opposite is true. More attention to the complex and indirect ways in which evidence renders up the past leads to more attention to the cogency and accuracy of argument.
For Bynum, the key notion is that we adopt a postmodern methodology—a kind of empathetic skepticism—that might undergird a new economy of thinking and writing history.
But paying more attention means taking more time. What I suggest is that an enthusiastic acceptance (instead of a grim fear) that each of us writes from a partial perspective might free us from the pressures of speed-up and over-production.
There are wonderfully radical implications in Bynum’s call for a postmodern turn in historical method, particularly in mapping out a philosophy that pushes toward deeper, more fully-realized scholarship that speaks to the meandering and often difficult pursuit of new truths, even partial truths (or better said, of evidence-based interpretations that join the rich fabric of meanings that make up the past).
The only problem is that Bynum really does sidestep the economic and institutional dimensions of the speed-up she identifies in scholarly production. She does so in a manner, I must add, that only an institutionally and economically well-established scholar is capable of doing (I want to make clear here that Bynum is, in my opinion, absolutely and deservedly well-established—her work is magnificent and this essay is important in its argument—but that doesn’t dismiss the condescending undertone that keeps creeping in to this otherwise insightful article).
The problem is twofold. The first is that the essay lacks of a deeper explanation of the speed-up’s causes, particularly as they relate to economic and institutional factors. “I am attempting to counter (at least for the United States) that current professional anxieties are owing primarily to economic or institutional forces,” she writes.
Bynum does not link the academic culture of the speed-up to any material basis. I’m not asking for a crass Marxist base-superstructure argument here. I’m a culture rover after all. But the problem is that Bynum only kind of “ahems” about the experience of the crisis for many aspiring scholars in the humanities. She writes, “Despite a disturbing increase in the number of people in adjunct or part-time positions who would prefer full-time employment, and an alarming tendency for women to suffer salary discrimination at later points in their careers and at elite institutions…” and then goes on to cite statistics to argue that the job market is not that bad and that assistant professors are still getting tenure (wait, what about all those adjunct and part-time people she just mentioned?). That’s it.

But, what are the causes of this speed-up? All we get is “as publishers are increasingly willing to review and publish manuscripts in only those areas they think will sell, and department chairpersons and senior professors put greater and greater pressure on young scholars to produce what Jonathan Beck has cynically called work that counts, is countable, and is counted, it will require courage (as indeed it has always done) to tackle genuinely new topics.” Nowhere in this essay do I grasp the reasons behind the increasing focus is on limiting economic and marketing factors (Beck’s idea of “work that counts, is countable, and is counted”). Why is this speed-up happening? What is it about, exactly?
We are just told to have “courage” and enjoy the feeling of our voices swept up in the partial, contingent making of history. Fine. I’m all for exchange and wondering and the mystery of it all. Go team! But are the tenure lines going to be “forever redone and in need of undoing,” as Bynum wants the postmodern knowledge-making to be? Are the endowed chairs going to be “partial,” “fragmentary,” and “truly collaborative”? If you do not alter those institutional and economic factors alongside the call for a postmodern methodology, you seem to be selling younger scholars a bill of goods (for which they will accrue much student debt).
This leads to a second problem—more a blind spot I think—in the essay. Nowhere does Bynum address the ways in which capitalism itself has adjusted so well to the postmodernism sense of “professional practices” she calls for us to adopt. If anyone has made the most of the postmodern acceptance of radical pluralism and its destabilizing, egalitarian implications, it is capitalism in its recent “conquest of cool” guise. I want to be on Bynum’s team, but will most of us wind up as “team members” in the Whole Foods history department? “Associates” instead of associate professors?
Unless structural changes in economics and institutions accompany Bynum’s call for new cultural and intellectual attitudes, this all sounds more like a descent into doublespeak than dissent of the courageous sort she asks young scholars to embark upon. It sounds like superficial changes rather than deeper liberations, or, worse yet, it opens the door for university managers to undo the economic and institutional basis in which postmodern pursuits of historical knowledge might flourish. The puzzle is how to let history become the brave unknown it should be while securing the means for more people to pursue its endless depths of mysterious wonder with dignity.
Despite all that, I find myself agreeing wholeheartedly with Bynum’s vision for historical scholarship: first, that there is, indeed, a speed-up; and, second, that she is absolutely right about the real story of history: that it is much more productive to think of it in a postmodern framework, as something contingent, partial, without a larger meta-narrative, and that we might approach our own work as part of a larger canvas, researching and writing “in the comic mode.”
There is a lot of fun and joy to be had in these hard labors of the mind, and there is a need for much more time to be spent on the stitching, on the discovery of new threads, on the fashioning and re-fashioning of the seams, and on the interdisciplinary exchange of tips and the creation of collective patchwork. But the work Bynum envisions will only work if the postmodern knowledge factory itself is reimagined alongside her call for a new postmodern mentalité.
thinking about cultural studies, civil society, the humanities, and more with michael bérubé.
Today and tomorrow, Michael Berube joins us at Northwestern for a talk and seminar as part of the Engaged Humanities Scholar as Public Intellectual research workshop.
Recently, Michael published an essay in the Chronicle of Higher Education, titled “What’s the Matter with Cultural Studies?,” that sparked quite a debate. Perhaps the best place to start out in exploring this debate would be Michael’s post at Crooked Timber, They Call It Theory Monday.
There’s a lot circulating around in this debate: (1) the disciplinary home for (or homelessness of) cultural studies within the university, (2) the place of cultural studies beyond the university in the larger political and civic realms, (3) the history of cultural studies (British/British-French/Global/etc.), and (4) the distortions of cultural studies by its enemies, particularly by fellow progressive intellectuals on the “false consciousness” wing of the left — these who use the ill-defined populism of cultural studies to dismiss the field as confusing base and superstructure, focusing on culture when basic economics should be the purview of the left.
I’ll leave these (very worthy) debates to your own Internet explorations, but I do want to highlight one sentence from Michael’s article. In speaking about the goals of the left (and I think we could even say a goal beyond partisan politics), Michael argues against the notion that all we must do to improve society is lift the veil of media manipulation and “manufactured consent.” Instead, he writes, “you have to do a great deal of groundwork in civil society to try to forge an egalitarian response.”
I am hoping that this weekend, we can explore this concept of civil society and the kind of groundwork that humanities scholars might do using the tools and knowledge of specialized research to engage more broadly in civic endeavors (and one of those tools is listening, which I plan to do a lot of this weekend).
As part of this conversation, I (and I hope others) will post to HASTAC so that we can investigate the digital dimensions of this groundwork, starting with the question that’s been on my mind lately: how is digital networking not only affecting academic practice and knowledge production but civil society itself? And not just the netroots of political civil society, but the broader terrain of associational life, the “cultural ectoplasm” (as my teacher Bob Cantwell called it) of civil society? Now that seems a task that cultural studies (and cultural history, my own field) might be well-suited for.
Let the foundational (and anti-foundational, if your sensibility tends that way) labor begin!
X-posted to HASTAC blog.